|
The press and air waves are full of comments about the Russian occupation of two ethnic enclaves -Abkhazia and South Ossetia - within the former Soviet republic of Georgia, now an independent state. The vast majority of opinions expressed are virulently anti-Russian. Regardless of where "right" and "wrong" lie here - and it is best to let history decide that issue - the Georgian imbroglio offers a great opportunity to review the US strategy in the Caucasus and other similar regions, a strategy which appears to be deeply flawed. The first flaw is inherent in the current concept of NATO, versus the purpose for which NATO was originally founded - the military containment of the then-expanding Soviet empire. The key word is "military". In Cold War days NATO was a highly credible military alliance, with a clear objective, and with each member state making substantial contributions in terms of armed forces for the fulfillment of the common goal. The military strength of NATO kept the Soviets at bay in Europe and significantly contributed to their eventual downfall. Today NATO no longer has an army to speak of. Only two of the European members - the UK and France - have any capability for projecting military power beyond their borders, and both are already stressed by their contributions in Iraq and Afghanistan. The other European members have, since the end of the Cold War, reduced their armed forces to the absolute minimum, and cannot carry operations abroad without massive assistance, which can only come from the US. The result of these military shortcomings is that NATO has become a primarily political organization used to pursue the policies of its member states. Unlike what was the case in Cold War days, these policies now cover a range of objectives, not necessarily compatible and often divergent. The primary objective of the US remains a military one: to use NATO to extend US reach - through the admission of new members and the establishment of bases - into Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Central Asia - much of this territory being former Soviet possessions or zones of influence. By contrast the objective of the major European members of NATO - such as Italy or Germany - is mostly economic. They see the above areas primarily as markets for their goods and services, and are fundamentally reluctant to engage in military expenditures, and even less in political or military confrontations. This divergence of objectives makes decisive and concerted action by NATO nearly impossible, as the Georgia case clearly illustrates. The second flaw lies within the current US policy of indiscriminate military expansion. A major principle of military strategy is that of the "economy of force", which states that available resources must be concentrated first and foremost on the principal and most important objective, with secondary objectives receiving only the strict minimum until the main goal has been achieved. Another fundamental principle is the need to maintain at all times a strategic reserve, to be committed only in cases of utmost necessity. Current US strategy flouts both principles. US armed forces are currently engaged in four conflict areas (Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Pakistan), plus covert or semi-covert operations around the globe. The US is simultaneously establishing bases in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa - bases which have to be built, supplied, manned and defended. The stress and shortages imposed by those multiple objectives are such that key operations have had to be subcontracted: the invasion of Somalia to Ethiopia; the training of the Georgian army partially to Israel; and the attempt to control the autonomous areas of Pakistan to that country's very reluctant army. The result is loss of control, evident in all three cases. It is obvious that the current strategy needs urgent review. Under the overall umbrella of the "war on terror" the US has doubled its military budget, occupied large swaths of foreign territory, and engaged in a number of conflicts, none of which is close to resolution. It has suffered thousands of casualties and spent trillions. Yet, 7 years after 9/11, Osama bin Laden is still alive. By our own admission his Al Qaeda organization is recovering and is planning further mayhem. This is a strategic failure of the first order.
Trackback(0)
 |
TrackBack URI for this entry
Subscribe to this comment's feed